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This Publicly Available Specification (PAS) was developed by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) in collaboration with The British Standards Institution (BSI) in 2008. The original edition made use of preventative strategies within the World Health Organisation guidance on the Terrorist Threat to Food [1] which was revised in May 2008.

This new 2010 edition of PAS 96 has been reviewed by relevant stakeholders and amendments made to ensure its continued relevance and accuracy.

In recent years an increasing chunk of companies’ corporate security or business continuity budget has been spent on maintaining back-up sites where data can be stored or from which the business could be run in an emergency.

However, security consultants point out that risk management begins at home with measures to safeguard company headquarters, branches, factories and greenfield sites.

For new buildings, once the nature of the risks to the business has been assessed, this means careful planning of the layout and configuration of the site or office and security professionals should be part of the process.

Crisis Management Seminar

We are continuing this very popular and successful Event series and this half day event will discuss topics such as Managing your People and Crisis Communications.

We are delighted to bring a significant Case Study from a leading British organisation, illustrating their approach to Crisis Management, including lessons learned from various crises. We will also be discussing the latest developments in business continuity, risk management and will include recently updated information on market developments.

A view on SOX and the BC Process

In a recent interesting piece by Dr Eric Schmidt of TDS Inc. he explores some of the background of the Sarbanes Oxley and looks at the implications it has for Organisations affected and specifically the impact on Business Continuity Practitioners. He argues persuasively that regulatory initiatives and world events are driving the convergence of business continuity, security and information management under the umbrella of enterprise risk management, sometimes referred to as global assurance.

Executive Summary

In September 2000, British farmers and truck drivers launched a dramatic campaign of direct action to protest a fuel duty. Their campaign followed a similar one by farmers, truckers, and fishermen in France, which had resulted in concessions from the French government.

The UK protesters blockaded fuel refineries and distribution depots, and, within days, created a fuel crisis that paralyzed CI sectors and brought the country to a virtual halt. The impact of the protest was much deeper than anticipated because it struck at a particularly vulnerable point of the UK economy -- the oil distribution network, which had been organized along just-in-time delivery principles. This, combined with anticipated shortages by fuel consumers and consequent panic buying, magnified the impact of the protests on practically all CI sectors in the UK.

Reseach finds that UK organisations are ‘sitting ducks’ as they fail to plan for major disruptions

07 March 2005

UK organisations admit they are failing to protect key assets and the ability to function in the face of major disruptions, according to research published today by the Chartered Management Institute. The 2005 Business Continuity Management Survey uncovered alarming inactivity, with organisations ignoring threats to their business, neglecting the needs of their managers, and not communicating plans with employees.

Information  could have been used to clone credit cards

Police are investigating reports that an Indian call centre worker sold the bank account details of 1,000 UK customers to an undercover reporter.
The Sun claims one of its journalists bought the personal details from an IT worker in Delhi for £4.25 each.

They included account holders' secret passwords, addresses, phone numbers and passport details, it reports.

City of London Police has begun an investigation after being handed a dossier by the newspaper.

While the allegations made in the dossier are very serious, City of London Police would like to remind people that incidents of this kind are still relatively rare City of London Police

The centre worker reportedly told the Sun he could sell up to 200,000 account details each month.

Details handed to the reporter had been examined by a security expert who had indicated they were genuine, the paper said.

The information passed on could have been used to raid the accounts of victims or to clone credit cards.

'Reflect on decision'

More than one bank is thought to be involved in the fraud.

A police spokeswoman said officers were not yet aware of "the breadth of what we are going to be investigating".

"While the allegations made in the dossier are very serious, City of London Police would like to remind people that incidents of this kind are still relatively rare," she said.

The Amicus union said it had warned of the "data protection implications" of offshoring financial services.

"Companies that have offshore jobs need to reflect on their decision and the assumption that cost savings benefiting them and their shareholders outweigh consumer confidentiality and confidence," senior finance officer Dave Fleming said.

Continuity Forum Comment

In the past few months we have seen an increased media focus on the security of Electronic Banking Systems with both TV and Print news sources citing alarming lapses in the procedures followed.

While technology can go a long way to 'secure' information there remains for many the issue of the 'insider'.

Whilst a lot of time and money is spent combating external Security threats it appears as though there is still some way to go to protect the organisation and its stakeholders from the actions of someone on the 'inside'. Whatever the motivation, Greed or Revenge, the threat posed can be far greater both in financial terms and in damage to the Reputation of the organisation.

To help you consider the risks to your organisation we have listed below some of the common characteristics of the 'insider' below:

Insider Characteristics

The majority of the insiders were former employees.

• At the time of the incident, 59% of the insiders were former employees or contractors of the affected organizations and 41% were current employees or contractors.

• The former employees or contractors left their positions for a variety of reasons. These included the insiders being fired (48%), resigning (38%), and being laid off (7%). Most insiders were either previously or currently employed full-time in a technical position within the organization.

• Most of the insiders (77%) were full-time employees of the affected organizations, either before or during the incidents. Eight percent of the insiders worked part-time, and an additional 8% had been hired as contractors or consultants. Two (4%) of the insiders worked as temporary employees, and one (2%) was hired as a subcontractor.

• Eighty-six percent of the insiders were employed in technical positions, which included system administrators (38%), programmers (21%), engineers (14%), and IT specialists (14%). Of the insiders not holding technical positions, 10% were employed in a professional position, which included, among others, insiders employed as editors, managers, and auditors. An additional two insiders (4%) worked in service positions, both of whom worked as customer service representatives.

Insiders were demographically varied with regard to age, racial and ethnic background, gender, and marital status.

• The insiders ranged in age from 17 to 60 years (mean age = 32 years) and represented a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds.

• Ninety-six percent of the insiders were male.

• Forty-nine percent of the insiders were married at the time of the incident, while 45% were single, having never married, and 4% were divorced.

• Thirty percent of the insiders had been arrested previously, including arrests for violent offences (18%), alcohol or drug related offences (11%), and nonfinancial/
fraud related theft offences (11%).

Organization Characteristics

The incidents affected organizations in the following critical infrastructure sectors:

• banking and finance (8%)

• continuity of government (16%)

• defence industrial base (2%)

• food (4%)

• information and telecommunications (63%)

• postal and shipping (2%)

• public health (4%)

In all, 82% of the affected organizations were in private industry, while 16% were government entities. Sixty-three percent of the organizations engaged in domestic activity only, 2% engaged in international activity only, and 35% engaged in activity both domestically and internationally.

Below we have outlined some of the effects on the organisation:

Consequences for Targeted Organizations

Key Findings

• Insider activities caused organizations financial losses, negative impacts to their
business operations and damage to their reputations.

• Incidents affected the organizations’ data, systems/networks, and components.

• Various aspects of organizations were targeted for sabotage by the insider.

• In addition to harming the organizations, the insiders caused harm to specific
individuals.

Supporting Data

Eighty-one percent of the organizations experienced a negative financial impact as a
result of the insiders’ activities. The losses ranged from a reported low of $500 to a
reported high of “tens of millions of dollars.” The chart below represents the percentage
of organizations experiencing financial losses within broad categories.
Percentage of Organizations Financial Loss

For the full 45 page Report or to comment on this piece please mail us HERE! or call Russell Price directly on +44 (0) 208 993 1599.